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The Persuasive Use of Emoions
Jamie Dow (University of Leeds) – j.dow@leeds.ac.uk
1 Introducion:
As is well-known, the first extended discussion of the emotions in Western philosophy comes in 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric, in a context where what is at issue is the use of emotion-arousal by an orator 
to influence their audience.1 It is surprising therefore that, among the abundant philosophical 
literature on the emotions,2 especially in recent decades, there is so little dealing with the ways in
which the arousal of emotions can be used by one person on another to persuade them of 
something.3 This paper focuses on this kind of process, and on the propriety of its use. We might 
frame the issue as arising from the recognition of the appeal of two claims.
1. Persuasion should succeed by getting people convinced on grounds that contribute to 
justifying their inclination to favour what the speaker proposes. (‘PROPRIETY’)
2. It is not required that persuasion’s methods be dispassionate. (‘ANTI-AUSTERITY’)
Neither of these claims is wholly uncontroversial, but both have – I take it – a very strong 
intuitive appeal. To hold them both requires that it be true that emotional persuasion contribute 
1 I use ‘emotions’ throughout, and take for granted that any differences between the pathê under discussion in the 
relevant passages of Aristotle and what we are talking about today when we speak of ‘emotions’ are fairly 
insubstantial (for a defence of this assumption, cf. (Konstan 2006) ch.1) and will not matter for the purposes of 
the argument.
2 Outside philosophy, the persuasive use of emotions features prominently in the discussion of advertising, selling,
and leadership, and there is a significant literature in psychology on the use of emotion among the “peripheral” 
(as opposed to direct) routes to persuasion. Cf. (O’Keefe 2002) 138-67; based on the tradition following (Petty and 
Cacioppo 1984). 
3 There is, of course, a significant secondary literature on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, some of which addresses the 
persuasive use of emotions. Cf. e.g. (Furley and Nehamas 1994), (Rorty 1996), (Rapp 2002), (Dow 2015). Much of 
this literature is focused upon the issue of whether Aristotle has a consistent view of the place of emotion-
arousal in rhetoric. Very little of it attends to exactly how the use of emotion-arousal in persuasion is supposed 
to work, and less still the propriety of the mechanisms by which it might work.
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in the right kind of way to swaying people in favour of the speaker’s proposal, i.e. that the emotions 
contribute to the audience’s justification for being inclined towards the speaker’s case. And this 
has often been found difficult, even in an era when the view of the emotions as irrational forces 
that sweep over the subject has largely fallen from favour. If these two claims cannot be held 
together, we will be under pressure to drop one of them, and it is the second (ANTI-AUSTERITY) 
that is the more likely to be dropped,4 to yield a view according to which persuasion ought 
properly not to proceed through the use of emotion-arousal, leaving either no place or only a 
marginal place for the emotions in persuasion.
This is a bad result, partly because it fails to accord with our intuitions about the permissible 
persuasive use of emotion, and partly because enforcing the resulting austere normative position 
tends to elevate further in public deliberation the contributions of white, middle-class men, and 
to marginalise the voices of those from already less-privileged groups – women, ethnic 
minorities, working-class people – whose persuasive styles are more excited and emotive, less 
dispassionate.5
So, this paper takes up the challenge of showing what we would need to believe, in order to hold 
these two claims together. I will focus on the kind of persuasion that aims at getting others to 
believe something. What persuasion of this kind should involve, I claim, is contributing to the 
justification of the beliefs it is trying to produce in the audience. The relevant kind of justification
here is epistemic justification.6 In order for emotions to contribute to epistemic justification, they
must, I hope to show, be capable themselves of being epistemically justified, and of transmitting 
that epistemic justification to the beliefs to which they help give rise. This seems to require that 
emotions be, in significant respects, similar to beliefs – they have representational contents, they 
involve the subject’s accepting those contents as true, they are candidates for epistemic 
justification, and their contents can properly feature as premises in inferences that justify the 
subject in believing their conclusions. That emotions have representational contents is here 
4 Normative requirements on persuasion are arguably under-theorised. So, while it is hard to point to explicit 
endorsement of ‘PROPRIETY’, its common-sense appeal makes it hard to discard, as does the fact (as I take it to 
be) that its violation is what accounts for many or all cases of wrongful manipulation. Cf. (Gorin 2014).
5 Cf. (Young 2000) 39-40.
6 I take epistemic justification, in the central case of beliefs, to be the merit that a belief has through being formed 
on the kind of basis that increases the likelihood of its being true (or perhaps of its counting as knowledge). Cf. 
(Steup 2005) §2.1 for an overview.
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taken as granted. The focus is on their involving acceptance, possessing epistemic justification, 
and having their contents feature in justifying inferences.
In tracing out how these claims might be held together, I am of course developing an Aristotelian 
position, since he is clearly committed, I believe, to both claims. And where possible, I will build 
using Aristotle’s own resources, such that if successful, the arguments will highlight the 
attractions of Aristotle’s inclusive account of how persuasive skill should be exercised. 
Although, ultimately, I wish to commend as plausible the picture I am setting out, the immediate 
task is to bring the picture itself into focus. What is it that we would need to believe in order to 
suppose that emotion-arousal had a proper role in the kind of rational persuasion we want to 
endorse? And it will be helpful as a first step in answering that question to get a clear view of the 
phenomena we are talking about. What kind of persuasive use of emotion-arousal do we have in 
mind?
2 The Phenomena of Persuasive Emoion
The persuasive use of emotion was common in the world Aristotle was familiar with, and 
examples might be cited from that era.7 Likewise, one might note how a number of landmark 
pieces of persuasive speech through global history, that we think of as clearly legitimate, are 
clearly emotive in how they bring about their persuasive effect.8 But I will here use as my central 
example Sojourner Truth’s “Ain’t I a Woman?” speech at the Women’s Convention in Akron, OH, 
in 1851, aimed at persuading those present and the wider world to support women’s suffrage. 
I want to say a few words about this matter. I am a woman's rights. [sic] I have as much muscle as 
any man, and can do as much work as any man. I have plowed and reaped and husked and chopped 
and mowed, and can any man do more than that? I have heard much about the sexes being equal. I 
can carry as much as any man, and can eat as much too, if I can get it. I am as strong as any man 
7 E.g. Plato, Apology 34b-c; Lysias 1; Demosthenes 56, or Philippic III.
8 E.g. in the Jewish tradition: Jonah 3.4; Hezekiah in 2 Chronicles 32.6-8; Jesus in Luke 12.4-5, 23.27-31; Abraham 
Lincoln  in (Lincoln 1863); Emmeline Pankhurst’s “Freedom or Death” speech,  (Pankhurst 1913); Jawaharlal 
Nehru’s “Tryst with Destiny” speech, (Nehru 1947); Martin Luther King’s “I have a dream” speech, (King 1963); 
Barack Obama’s 2008 victory speech, (Obama 2008); Julia Gillard’s so-called “Misogyny” speech, (Gillard 2012). ; 
Ashley Judd’s use of Nina Donovan’s “I am a Nasty Woman” poem, (Donovan 2017). 
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that is now. As for intellect, all I can say is, if a woman have a pint, and a man a quart – why can't 
she have her little pint full? You need not be afraid to give us our rights for fear we will take too 
much, – for we can't take more than our pint'll hold. The poor men seems to be all in confusion, and 
don't know what to do.9
Clearly it persuades, in large measure, through its use of emotion. It invites admiration for the 
contribution to society of women, indignation at their unjust treatment, and a kind of ridicule of 
the absurdity of the opposition. Is this problematic? Should people be persuaded to be committed
to women’s suffrage in a more austere way that dispenses with admiration, indignation, and 
ridicule? Intuitively: no. If there is any prospect for vindicating as legitimate the persuasive use of
emotion, it is in cases like this. Cases like this invite us to endorse both ANTI-AUSTERITY and 
PROPRIETY.
When Aristotle incorporates the persuasive use of emotion within his account of the kind of 
rhetorical skill worth valuing, it is perhaps cases like this that he has in mind. Insofar as we share 
this kind of “anti-austerity” intuition, it will be because we too think that Sojourner Truth, like 
Lysias and Demosthenes before her, is not to be faulted for including the engagement of audience 
emotions within her persuasive arsenal. 
This is reflected in Aristotle’s more generalised analytic remarks, and in the advice he offers to 
orators on the persuasive use of emotion-arousal in speeches.
There are three kinds of proofs provided through the speech. Some are in the character of the 
speaker, others in the listener being brought into a certain condition, and others in the argument 
itself through demonstrating something or being taken to demonstrate something. (Rhetoric 1.2, 
1356a1-4)
Aristotle is here specifying the types of “proof” (his word is pistis) that form part of the repertoire
of the expert orator. In calling them types of “proof” he is indicating that these are things that 
constitute proper grounds on which for listeners to be convinced of the orator’s case.10 The 
arousal of their emotions, at least in the ways Aristotle will be recommending, is just such a 
9 Text reproduced in (Marable and Mullings 2003), 67-8.
10 This claim is defended at length in (Dow 2015) ch.2.
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thing.11 Accordingly, he recommends that orators arouse audience emotions in certain ways, in 
pursuit of their persuasive goals. Of course, it is part of this rationale for the use of emotion that 
it works! Emotion-arousal is often an effective means of securing persuasive goals.
Not only does Aristotle recognise emotion’s persuasive efficacy, he recognises that the precise 
contours of each emotion that the orator stirs up in their audience make a difference to the 
nature of its persuasive effects on the listeners.
[Proofs] through the listeners: whenever people are induced to an emotional state by the speech. For 
we don’t give judgements in the same way when we are upset as when we are happy, or when 
sympathetic as when hostile. (Rhetoric 1.2, 1356a14-16)
Since rhetoric is [exercised] for the sake of a judgement (judging is what political deliberators do, 
and a lawsuit is a judgement), it is necessary to pay attention not only to making the argument 
demonstrative and credible, but also to present oneself as being a certain way, and make the listener
be a certain way. For it makes a huge difference as far as credibility [or proof, π ] is concerned,ίστις
especially in political deliberations, but also in lawsuits, both for the speaker to appear to have 
certain qualities, and for them [the listeners] to take him to be disposed in a certain way towards 
them, and additionally if they themselves also are actually in a certain condition. For the speaker to 
appear to have certain qualities is more useful for political deliberations, and for the listener to be 
put into a certain condition is more useful for trials. For the same things do not seem to be so to 
people that are sympathetic as to people that are hostile, nor to people that are angry as to people 
that are calm. Rather they seem either entirely different or different in magnitude. Thus to the 
person that is sympathetic to the defendant it seems that they have committed no crime, or a trivial 
one, whereas to the hostile listener, it is the opposite. To the person that is eager and hopeful, if the 
future prospect is something pleasant, it seems that it will happen and will be good, whereas to the 
listener that lacks these emotions or is feeling gloomy, it is the opposite. (Rhetoric 2.1, 1377b20-
1388a5)
Feelings incline listeners in particular directions. Hostility towards someone inclines listeners 
towards judging them guilty, sympathy inclines listeners away from such a verdict: it is this way 
round and not vice versa. Feelings of eagerness and hopefulness encourage judgements to the 
effect that some hoped-for prospect’s is more likely actually to happen, and that it will be good 
11 Cf. also Rhetoric 2.11, 1388b29-30; 3.1, 1403b6-13; and the passages cited below.
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when it happens: not judgements with the opposite content. Those are made more likely by 
gloomy feelings, or at least the absence of eagerness and hope. Aristotle directs the orator’s 
attention to these very obvious features of how emotion affects judgement: it is the orator’s 
business to develop a systematic understanding of what distinctive kinds of effects particular 
types of emotions have. And he presents this as part of the understanding that will underpin their
skilful deployment of emotional ‘proofs’. This observation about the way the particular contours 
of a given emotion serve to produce specific persuasive effects is important, in that it highlights 
that the persuasive role of emotion goes beyond simply making listeners generally more 
attentive to the speech – what one might call a “coffee and cigarettes” view of the persuasive role
of emotions.12 That is to say: emotions are not simply perking listeners up to be more attentive 
generally, or making them more prone to be decisive and quicker to form a verdict. They incline 
audiences in particular directions depending on the specific features of the emotion used.
This general position is reflected also in the specific advice Aristotle offers about the use of the 
various types of emotions, when he treats them one by one in Rhetoric 2.2-11.13 He reminds the 
reader at the end of these accounts that these instructions on arousing and dissolving the various
passions count as instructions on how to give “proofs” (pisteis, 1388b29-30). In other words, his 
commitment to the use of emotion-arousal in skilful oratory (i.e. to ANTI-AUSTERITY), is held 
concurrently with his commitment to the kind of rhetoric that works by providing listeners with 
proper grounds for conviction (i.e. to PROPRIETY).
When we consider Aristotle’s position alongside examples such as the Sojourner Truth speech, we
see the attractions of this view. There is intuitively a strong case for vindicating both of the 
claims, PROPRIETY and ANTI-AUSTERITY, insofar as it seems correct to say that audiences can be 
justified in their inclination to adopt the speaker’s proposed conclusions, on the basis of 
persuasive devices that include the arousal of their emotions.
12 Thanks to Robbie Williams for this phrase.
13 He makes clear that the analysis he provides of the nature and objects of anger, hostility, fear, shame, pity, 
indignation and the like, is intended to be used by the orator in the composition of their speech so as to arouse 
these emotions to achieve their persuasive goals, cf. Rhetoric 2, 1380a1-5, 1380b31-4, 1382a16-19, 1383a8-12, 
1385a14-15, 1385a29-b6, 1387a3-5, 1387b17-21, 1388a24-30. This view is compatible with the suggestion that the 
bulk of the material in Aristotle’s analysis of emotion types in Rhetoric 2.2-11 was originally developed for other 
purposes, and used later by Aristotle in putting together the books of the Rhetoric that come down to us: cf. 
(Kennedy 1991) introduction; (Fortenbaugh 2002) 106.
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3 The Cogniive Mechanisms of Emoional Persuasion
We may, however go further than these general observations, and see that the way emotion-
arousal achieves its persuasive effects seems to be by contributing to or undermining the 
inferences that listeners appropriately make in arriving at their judgements or decisions. The role
looks cognitive. This is most easily seen in the instructions Aristotle offers to orators on how to 
use emotion persuasively.
Aristotle’s definition of the passions in Rhetoric 2, and his general instructions about how to use 
an understanding of the passions in rhetoric, are as follows:
The passions are those on account of which people change and differ with respect to their 
judgements and which are accompanied by pain and pleasure, for example, anger, pity, fear and as 
many others as are of this kind, plus their opposites. With each, we must distinguish three things: I 
mean, for example, (1) what state people are in when they are angry, (2) at whom they typically get 
angry, and (3) on what grounds. If we had one or two of these but not all of them, it would be 
impossible to arouse anger, and likewise with the others also. So, just as in our earlier discussion 
[about constructing proofs through explicit arguments] we set out the premises systematically, we 
will do so similarly in connection with these too, observing the division just mentioned. 
(1378a19-29)
The passions, as well as involving pleasure and distress, are things that account for changes in 
judgement, and perhaps are themselves changes in judgement (various interpretations are 
possible here). They are aroused by deploying an understanding of what kind of (say) distress 
and/or desire is involved in each passion, what kinds of objects elicit that passion, and what 
grounds for the passion need to be apprehended by the listener if that passion is to be produced 
in them. The most natural interpretation is that the orator is to present the person in question as 
a suitable object of (say) anger, as having features (or having done things) that are grounds for 
feeling angry, and in such a way that it is distress (not pleasure) that is aroused at these things, 
and a desire for revenge. The process of doing so is to mirror the process of constructing 
explicitly-presented arguments: i.e. a process of methodically selecting premises based on the 
orator’s systematic knowledge of what premises support what conclusions. Indeed, one might 
plausibly read the final sentence of the passage above as indicating that the orator’s method of 
emotion-arousal will literally involve “premises” for the arousal of emotions, and that what we 
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are to be offered in the ensuing chapters on the individual emotion types constitutes the 
construction of a systematic bank of knowledge regarding which premises will support the 
arousal of which emotions.14 The premises arouse the emotion, and the emotion in turn gets the 
audience to draw a particular “verdict”. The emotion is an interim conclusion which then 
functions as a premise  of a further inference by which the eventual “verdict” is derived.
That Aristotle sees the role of emotion-arousal in persuasion in terms of how they contribute or 
block the availability of premises for inferences is suggested by his remarks on specific types of 
emotions. Good examples are the arousing and calming of anger, and the blocking of envy by the 
arousal of pity.
So, then, who people get angry at, what state they’re in when they’re angry, and on what grounds 
they get angry have all been covered. And it is clear that one would need to use the speech to get 
them [the audience] into the kind of state in which people are angry, and to make out that one’s 
opponents are liable to the kinds of things that are grounds for getting angry, and are themselves 
the kind of people at whom people get angry. (Rhetoric 2.2, 1380a1-5)
So, it is clear that those who want to calm an audience down should speak using these 
commonplaces [‘topoi’], putting the listeners themselves into that condition [i.e. of being calm], and 
making out the objects of their anger as either fearsome, or worthy of reverence, or as benefactors, 
or as having acted involuntarily, or as extremely distressed at what has been done. (2.3, 1380b31-4)
It is clear on what grounds such people [i.e. envious people] are pleased, and at which people, and in 
what state of mind: for the states of mind in which they experience distress are those in which they 
will be pleased at the opposite things. So, if the listeners themselves are put into that condition [i.e. 
made to feel envious], and those that are laying claim to pity or to some benefit are made out to be 
such as we have described [i.e. if they are made out to be appropriate objects of audience envy], it is 
obvious that they will not receive pity from those with whom the decision rests. (2.10, 1388a24-
30)15
It is certainly clear from these passages that Aristotle envisages the arousal of emotions to occur 
at the hands of the skilled orator through the presentation of evidence that the person in 
14 The interpretative points mentioned in this paragraph are discussed in (Dow 2015) ch.8.
15 One might also consider 2.9, 1387a3-5, and 2.9, 1387b18-21, on blocking pity.
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question is an apt target of that particular emotion – the orator gets the audience to see the world
in the ways typical of (say) an angry person, with their opponent as the object of their anger, and 
what they have done as grounds for their anger. The second and third passages equally indicate 
how the presentation of such emotion-relevant premises can block the arousal of a particular 
emotion. The third passage indicates that this can be expected to bear then on what the audience 
does next, i.e. on what benefits or punishments they confer by upholding one side or the other’s 
case, in their verdict and sentence.
Emotion-arousal serves a persuasive function because of the role that emotions play in 
inferences, that is in arguments – broadly-construed – presented by the speaker. This role 
consists in their contribution of premises or their serving to block the use of premises by which 
the conclusion is supported.
The kind of way in which Aristotle’s view might apply to the Sojourner Truth case could be 
spelled out as follows. She advances an argument which, of course, can be followed in an 
emotionless way by the audience. But it can also work emotionally (perhaps simultaneously), 
1. Women have muscle, and plow, reap, husk, chop, mow, carry and eat on a par with men.
2. Women contribute impressively to society (from 1.).  [ADMIRATION].
3. It is unjust for such admirable contributors (cf. 2) to be treated in such a substantially 
inferior way (not even getting their “pint” to a man’s “quart”).  [INDIGNATION].
4. Opposition to women’s suffrage is based on a fear that women will take more than their 
“little pint” can hold, on the part of men “all in confusion”.  [RIDICULE].
5. If (or perhaps, insofar as) it is unjust and absurd to oppose women’s suffrage, we should 
not oppose it.
6. It is unjust (3.) and absurd (4.) to oppose women’s suffrage.
7. THEREFORE: we should not oppose women’s suffrage.
It is obviously an empirical matter whether this is indeed what goes on within the psychological 
mechanisms of an audience on any particular occasion, and whether in general this tends to be 
the mechanism by which seemingly legitimate emotional persuasive methods such as those to 
which I am calling attention achieve their effects. This cannot be established from the armchair. 
Nevertheless, we can see that this is a perfectly intelligible way in which emotional persuasion 
could work; it seems to be how Aristotle saw emotional proofs working in his Rhetoric; and it 
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seems to offer an intelligible explanation of cases such as that of Sojourner Truth. In what 
follows, I undertake to explore the implications of this understanding of how emotional 
persuasion can work. In particular, what must be true of the emotions and the justification of 
emotions, if this view is correct?
4 Some condiions for legiimate use of emoions to 
support inferences.
Do emotions have the right kinds of features to play the role assigned to them in this view? The 
kind of role in question seems simply to mirror the uncontroversial role of beliefs in persuasion. 
Clearly one kind of legitimate persuasion involves presenting someone with reasons to believe 
something, getting them thereby to form justified beliefs, and then using those justified beliefs 
(plus other knowledge or justified beliefs of theirs perhaps) to get them to accept some further 
conclusion on the basis that it is entailed or recommended by those things they have come to 
believe. This is a familiar process, and involves what we might call ‘belief-arousal’. A variant on it 
might be where persuasion involves literally ‘showing’ something, such that perception supplies 
one or more of the premises involved in the inference. In both cases, the adoption of the 
conclusion inherits the epistemic merits of the way in which the premises are apprehended. Can 
‘emotion-arousal’ play the same uncontroversially legitimate role as is played in each of these 
cases by directing perceptual attention (‘showing’) and by giving reasons to believe something? 
Or is there something about the nature of emotions, and how they differ from beliefs or 
perceptual states that rules this out?
I propose that in order for emotion-arousal to contribute to inference-based persuasion in this 
kind of way, at least the following conditions must be met.
1. The inference must be performed, such that the conclusions are believed because of the 
truth (or likelihood) of the premises.16
2. The premises must contribute justification to the conclusion.
3. If the premises are not perceived, they must be asserted.
16 Cf. Aristotle Topics 1.1, 100a25-7; Prior Analytics 1.1, 24b18-20, “something distinct from those suppositions 
necessarily comes about by those things’ being the case”.
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The first of these is straightforward: to the extent that the inference is to contribute to the 
justification that the subject has for believing its conclusion, they must to that extent believe the 
conclusion on the basis of the truth (or likelihood) of the premises. In order for this to be the case, 
they must actually perform the inference and believe the conclusion on the basis of having done 
so.
The second condition is that insofar as the subject’s justification for believing the conclusion is 
derived from the inference, it must be derived from the epistemic good standing of the premises. 
Take the case from the Hebrew Bible of the prophet Jonah’s (emotional) persuasion of the people 
of Nineveh to change their ways. The inference involved is this:
1. If there is a terrible destruction coming, then we must do all we can to avoid it.
2. There is a terrible destruction coming.
THEREFORE:
3. We must do all we can to avoid it.
Perhaps premise 1 might be known to Jonah’s audience in some very robust sense. Their 
justification for believing the conclusion on the basis of this inference will most significantly 
depend on the epistemic justification contributed by their grasp of premise 2. The audience may 
believe premise 2, but the weaker their justification for holding it, the weaker their justification 
for adopting the conclusion on the basis of the inference. Or persuasion might proceed by 
showing someone that a key premise is true – i.e. enabling them literally to perceive the content 
of the premise, and establish perceptually for themselves that it is true. Perhaps Jonah might, in a
variant of the narrative, have shown the people of Nineveh the divinely-appointed armies 
massing over the brow of nearby hills to destroy them. But either way, their epistemic 
justification in believing the conclusion (insofar as they believe it on the basis of this inference) is
contributed by the premises. And this may be either through the subject’s being justified in 
affirming the premises, or through their perception of the premises being a source of justification 
in the way that a perceptual experience in favourable conditions is. On the latter suggestion, the 
idea is not that perceptions are themselves justified, but that they are evidentially valuable, and 
can confer justification on beliefs based upon them. If subjects are to be justified in believing the 
conclusion of an inference, that justification must be conferred, in one way or another, by the 
premises.
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The third condition simply highlights that one cannot be justified in believing the conclusion of 
an inference whose premises one merely entertains in thought, without asserting them. In 
relation to this condition, we set aside the possibility that the premises might perceived in an 
evidentially valuable way. That possibility apart, it seems as though the subject can only be 
justified in believing the conclusion if they actually assert the premises.
In the remaining sections, let us consider how these premises apply to emotional persuasion, and 
what light they shed on how we would need to understand the emotions for them to play the kind
of legitimate role in persuasion that we have been tracing out.
5 “Because of the truth / likelihood of the premises”
Let us take the first of these conditions first. Insofar as the subject’s justification for believing the 
conclusion is derived from the premises, the conclusion must be adopted because of the 
(supposed) truth or likelihood of the premises and because of the merits of the inference. 
Nevertheless, this needs to be understood in a way that avoids the pitfalls of over-
intellectualising the process. It should not be a condition of one’s being justified in adopting the 
conclusion of a valid inference based on justified belief in its premises that one have reflected 
explicitly upon (still less have a justified explicit belief in) the validity of the inference used.17 One 
does not need beliefs explicitly about good inferences to be competent in using them. This is 
important in the emotional case. For it might have seemed significant that dispassionate 
persuasion has a higher likelihood of involving explicit reflection on the validity of the inferential
connection between premises and conclusion than does emotional persuasion. But if it is clear 
that this is not a condition of the transmission of justification even in the dispassionate case, it 
would be a mistake to impugn the emotional case because it is less likely to be fulfilled. What is 
required in both the emotional and the dispassionate cases is the same: that the conclusion be 
accepted because of the supposed truth or likelihood of the premises, through the competent 
performance of a good inference.
17 Cf. (L. Carroll 1895). 
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6 That the premises contribute jusiicaion
We recall that if a successful case of persuasion is legitimate, this will be because the audience 
comes to be justified in believing the speaker’s proposed conclusion (‘PROPRIETY’). On the model 
of emotional persuasion set out in section 3 above, the emotions aroused contribute premises to 
an inference the speaker intends the audience to perform, and thereby to believe their proposed 
conclusion. The relevant kind of justification for their believing the conclusion is epistemic. Hence, 
the kinds of justification of the premises that the emotions used must confer is epistemic 
justification.18 So, they must either be sources of epistemic justification, or themselves possess 
epistemic justification.
The idea that emotions can themselves be justified epistemically will be unproblematic on a 
number of views of emotions. If emotions can be had for reasons (for example, because of 
evidence that their object is dangerous) and extinguished by reasons (for example, by evidence 
that their object is not dangerous after all), and if they can be assessed for how well justified they 
are in the light of the reasons available, then they would seem to be capable of possessing 
precisely the kind of epistemic justification that in legitimate emotional persuasion gets 
conferred onto the adoption of the conclusion. This can be readily accommodated on lots of views
of emotions, not just judgement-based views such as Solomon’s or Nussbaum’s, but also on those 
views, such as Goldie’s view of emotions as sui generis states, that accommodate the recognition of
emotions as reasons-responsive and reasons-assessable.19 
Conversely, it seems equally clear that on so-called “thought-theories” of emotions,20 insofar as 
emotions may be based on unasserted thoughts, or partially constituted by such thoughts, it is 
very difficult to make sense of how one could be justified in believing the conclusion of an 
inference in which one or more premises was contributed by such emotions. For we would not be 
epistemically justified in believing the conclusion of an inference whose premises were merely 
entertained in thought, unasserted. Such premises could not provide justification for believing 
the conclusion.
18 The related issue of the various kinds of ways in which the emotions can be assessed for rationality is 
summarised in (Elster 1999) 284-7, and discussed at length through ch.4.
19 Cf. (Solomon 1993); (Nussbaum 2001); and (Goldie 2004). 
20 Representative proponents include (Greenspan 1988), (N. Carroll 2003), and (Gaut 2007).
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Of course, it is characteristic of such views that while holding that emotions involve cognitions, 
they are pluralist about what kinds of cognitions can be involved in different cases: thus, some 
emotions are based on beliefs, others on thoughts, others on vivid imaginings, and so on. The 
motivation for such views is the need to accommodate cases of emotion where it seems that the 
subject lacks beliefs or judgements with the requisite content. These include cases of recalcitrant 
emotion, such as fearing a dog one knows to be harmless, and cases of emotional response to 
what one knows to be fictional, such as pitying Anna Karenina. Since emotions, it is claimed, can 
be based on thoughts or imaginings, there is no difficulty about the possibility of such cases 
occurring, nor the rationality of having such feelings. Nevertheless, it is important for our 
purposes to notice that thought theories are not supposed to exclude the possibility of emotions’ 
being based on beliefs or judgements. Emotions, on this view, can be based on a variety of 
different kinds of cognition.21 However, only some kinds of cognition can be sources of epistemic 
justification. On thought-theories of emotion, the use of emotion in persuasion will be legitimate 
only where the emotion in question can contribute epistemic justification to the adoption of the 
speaker’s conclusion. Emotions involving unasserted thoughts and imaginings will not fit the bill. 
It seems as though it will only be emotions that are themselves candidates for epistemic 
justification, such as those involving beliefs or judgements, that can play this role, and possibly 
also those based on perceptions if the problems already highlighted for perceptual views of 
emotions can be overcome. None of this amounts to any objection to thought theories: the claim 
here is that they will accommodate the legitimate persuasive use of emotion by using the 
explanatory resources that they share in common with judgementalist and sui-generis views, or 
with perceptual views.
It also seems clear that the emotions involved in legitimate emotional persuasion cannot be (or 
cannot depend for their representational aspects on) what Tamar Gendler has dubbed “aliefs”. It 
is a defining characteristic of aliefs that they are arational, that is to say that they cannot be 
assessed for how rational or otherwise it is to have them.22 This seems immediately to exclude the
possibility of their being epistemically justified. Again, it is not obvious that this constitutes an 
objection to any of Gendler’s claims about aliefs: although is it part of the characterisation of 
21 Cf. e.g. (Gaut 2007) 211.
22 Cf. (Gendler 2008a) 641, and (Gendler 2008b) 557. Gendler does not defend this claim in detail in either of the two 
landmark articles in which alief is introduced, though it is implied by the description of the psychological 
mechanisms by which aliefs occur. She does allow that aliefs can be useful, detrimental, laudable, contemptible, 
norm-concordant, norm-discordant, teleofunctionally-concordant, and teleofunctionally-discordant (570-72).
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aliefs that they are affective, there does not seem to be any suggestion that all emotions involve 
(or are constituted in part or whole by) aliefs. For our purposes, the key observation is that, as 
characterised by Gendler, aliefs cannot account for the representational element of emotions 
involved in the kind of legitimate emotional persuasion we have been exploring.
A further category of views of emotions holds that they are perceptions, or are closely analogous 
to perceptions. Since perceptual states are not had for reasons, and are not reasons-assessable, 
views of the emotions as perceptual states will not be in a position to recognise the possibility of 
emotions’ contributing to the justification of the conclusion by being themselves epistemically 
justified. (This, of course, is already a disadvantage of such views.) Perceptual views of emotion 
need instead to insist that in any legitimate cases of emotional persuasion, the emotions involved 
contribute to justifying the adoption of the conclusion by being themselves sources of epistemic 
justification, just as perceptual states might plausibly be understood as sources of justification for
beliefs that things are the way perception represents them as being, i.e. they are evidence that 
things are thus and so.23 
In principle, this might be fine. In practice, there are difficulties. There are widely-canvassed 
doubts about whether emotions can be perceptual states in this way, in the first place.24 But 
beyond these general doubts, Michael Brady has drawn attention to problems in the way the 
perceptual model conceives of the epistemic role of emotions.25 I shall reprise one of his 
arguments and add one of my own. Brady points out that the perceptual model implies that 
emotions are evidentially valuable in cases where this is not plausible. In the perceptual case, 
suppose a reliable colleague tells me that it’s raining and everything’s getting soaked outside, and
then I step outside and perceive that it’s raining and everything’s getting soaked. Although, in 
important respects, my perceptual experience tells me some things that I already knew, it 
strengthens my evidential position – I have stronger epistemic justification than I had before for 
my conviction that it is raining. The perceptual theory suggests it should be like this in the 
emotional case. But it isn’t. Brady’s example is that the sharp horns and rapid advance of the bull 
23 XXX chase through Prinz, Doering, Tappolet, etc.
24 Cf. e.g. (Helm 2001) ch.2. Note that many views that adopt the label “perceptual” do no hold that emotions are 
literally perceptual states, and so would (as far as our discussion goes) need to be considered alongside other 
views, e.g. of emotions as judgement-like, or as sui generis states, or as composites or syndromes where there 
might be a variety of different types of representational states involved. Cf. (Brady 2016) 52-69.
25 Cf. (Brady 2016) esp. 109-117.
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in the same field give me good reason to believe it is dangerous. On the perceptual view of 
emotions, fear is a perceptual experience of its object’s dangerousness, and has evidential value 
accordingly. So, my fear itself should give me extra evidence, perceptual evidence, above and 
beyond what I have in the bull’s sharp horns and rapid advance, for believing that the bull is 
dangerous. But this is implausible.26 In the Sojourner Truth case, if we ask what reasons we would 
have for believing that women are being treated unjustly, the perceptual theory says implausibly,
that in addition to the facts of women’s contributing equally and being treated worse, the listeners’
indignation at this injustice itself counts as extra evidence that women are being treated unjustly. 
I concur with Brady that this suggests that emotions do not serve as sources of epistemic value, 
i.e. as evidence, in the way that perceptions do.
A further difficulty relates to the model of emotional persuasion that we are considering. The 
calibre of justification that the audience has, as a result of emotional persuasive arguments, 
varies from case to case. And one way in which it varies is that the level of epistemic justification 
conferred on the conclusion by the emotional premises varies. This most natural way to explain 
this is by the variation in how justified the emotions in question themselves are. But the 
perceptual model does not have recourse to this explanation, since it says that emotions are 
perceptions, and hence have epistemic value as sources of justification, not by themselves being 
epistemically justified. Perceptual theories can, of course, rate some perceptions as evidentially 
more valuable than others – what I see through the fog, or at night time, or with my glasses off, 
has less evidential value than what I see with my glasses on, in broad daylight, on a clear day. 
Some conditions are better for perception than others. Could there be some account of better 
conditions for emotional perceptions that could explain why some emotional arguments provide 
better epistemic justification, and hence persuade more legitimately than others?
Consider again the indignation premise (3) in Sojourner Truth’s argument. What would be 
favourable conditions for a more accurate emotional “perception” of the injustice done to 
women? In the perceptual case, favourable conditions are conditions that favour the accuracy of 
the perceptual representation. In the emotional case, it is not literally the case that (for example) 
Sojourner Truth’s listeners are in perceptual contact with the injustice itself. The “accuracy” of 
their feelings of indignation at this injustice, surely depends on the quality of the evidence and 
reasons on which it rests – i.e. on the evidential support for women’s contributing equally and 
26 Cf. (Brady 2016) 113-4.
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being treated worse. But if that is what the level of justification contributed by emotions depends 
on, then the epistemic contribution of the audience’s indignation to the persuasive argument 
stems not from their having the evidential character of perceptual experiences, as sources of 
epistemic justification, but from those emotions’ being themselves epistemically justified by 
other reasons and evidence, of the kind that Sojourner Truth partly supplies and partly can take 
for granted. In other words, accounting for the variation in how much justification is contributed 
by emotions drives us away from the perceptual model and back towards views on which 
emotions are themselves candidates for justification. I cannot see a plausible alternative to this 
available within the perceptual model.27 
This is already a significant result. There must be at least some emotions that can be epistemically
justified in something like the way in which beliefs can be. And it can be important in at least 
some contexts – such as where emotions are being used persuasively – to assess emotions for 
their epistemic justification.28 Of course, this does not show that emotions must literally involve 
beliefs or judgements, but it does seem to underscore the credentials of those theories of emotion
that recognise belief-like elements in at least some emotions.
We are seeking to understand how emotional persuasion such as that used by Sojourner Truth 
could be legitimate, where this is understood in the kind of way suggested by “PROPRIETY” 
above. Following Aristotle’s plausible proposal, we are thinking of emotional persuasion as using 
inferences, in which the audience’s emotions play the same role as their beliefs might have done, 
as the way in which one or more premises of the inference are supplied. We highlighted three key
conditions for this to result in the audience’s being justified in believing the conclusion. The first 
was that the audience perform the inference – this presents no special obstacle for emotional 
persuasion. The second was that the premises contribute justification to the conclusion: and it 
27 Space does not permit an exploration of the possible alternatives. One possibility that might initially seem 
plausible is that emotions can vary in the clarity with which their objects are grasped or represented, such that 
clearly-focused indignation would have greater evidential value than vague indignation (analogously to the 
greater value of clear-eyed vision over foggy vision). But this will not withstand scrutiny. The epistemic value of 
emotions does not in fact vary by how clearly they represent their objects – irrational and misguided jealousy 
may represent the imagined infidelity with which it is obsessed very clearly indeed, and conversely the justified 
compassion of a Huckleberry Finn might involve a rather unclear representation of its objects.
28 This is assuming also that one grants the intuitions about the legitimacy of the use of emotion arousal in cases 
such as those cited, and the supposition taken up from Aristotle that emotions contribute to persuasion by 
contributing premises to inferences.
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turns out that this is difficult to accommodate on some theories of emotion, and requires that 
emotions exhibit the rather belief-like feature of being candidates for epistemic justification. The 
third condition takes us in a similar direction.
7 That the premises be asserted
The third condition is simple, and applies in cases where the premises are not supplied 
perceptually. It is this: one cannot be epistemically justified in believing a conclusion on the basis 
of an inference that depends on premises that one merely entertains in thought without 
(mentally) asserting them, i.e. without being committed to their being true, or at least likely. But 
this is very significant for emotional persuasion. For if emotions are the mental state in the 
listener providing premises for an inference that they perform, and whose conclusion they are 
being supposed to be justified in believing (on the basis of the inference), those emotions had 
better involve the subject’s commitment to the truth (or likelihood) of the content that 
constitutes the premise. In Sojourner Truth’s argument, if the audience is supposed to be justified
in believing (6 and 7) on the basis of this argument that it would be unjust to oppose women’s 
suffrage, and that they should not oppose it, they had better not leave crucial premises (such as 3)
unasserted and merely entertained in thought.
However, on some views of what the emotions are, they might involve no commitment to the 
truth of the way they represent things as being, i.e. they involve nothing like assertion. This is 
true of views in which emotions involve or are based on what Tamar Gendler has called “aliefs”. 
On “thought theories” of emotion, which usually are pluralist about what kind of cognitive 
attitude is involved in emotion, this condition requires that those emotions that contribute to 
persuasion in the way described must involve a cognitive attitude of commitment to the truth (or
likelihood) of its representational contents. The emotions must be, to that extent, belief-like.
It doesn’t follow from this that emotions literally involve beliefs. Indeed, it has often been 
supposed that their representational aspect cannot literally consist of beliefs, because of the 
kinds of ways in which beliefs and emotions can conflict. This is maintained partly on the basis 
that emotions seem to involve the exercise of a psychological capacity that has some 
independence from the subject’s beliefs and belief-forming processes. Emotions and beliefs can 
conflict; ordinary processes for belief formation and belief revision can be impotent to form or 
revise emotions; and emotions seem to be able to be aroused and dispelled in ways (e.g. by music 
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and images) that leave beliefs untouched. This suggests that they are distinct from those beliefs. 
A second basis for rejecting the involvement of beliefs in emotions has to do with the degree of 
similarity between the cognitive attitudes involved in emotions and those involved in believing. 
For example, Sabine Döring points out that when one feels afraid of something one knows not to 
merit fear, whatever irrationality may attach to the subject, it does not reach the levels involved 
in, say, Moore’s paradox.29 A thorough discussion of this issue cannot be pursued here. 
Nevertheless one of the goals of this paper is to draw attention to the fact that the legitimate 
persuasive use of emotion has important bearing on this issue of how exactly we should 
characterise the cognitions involved in the emotions. If the legitimate persuasive use of emotion 
is to be vindicated, as I suggest it should be, and if it is to be understood as operating through the 
emotions’ supplying premises to arguments that confer epistemic justification on the adoption of 
their conclusion, then this seems to suggest that emotions have two belief-like features. These are 
that they are themselves candidates for epistemic justification, and that they involve 
commitment to the truth (or likelihood) their represented content. This does not amount to the 
claim that emotions literally are, in whole or part, beliefs; but it is no less significant for that.
These features, arguably, can be accommodated not just by judgementalist views of emotion, but 
by sui generis views such as Goldie’s, by pluralist views of the cognitive attitudes involved in 
emotions, such as are held by most “thought theorists”, and by others besides. But they cannot be
accommodated by all views of the emotions, and if the above account of emotional persuasion is 
correct, this counts against those views.
8 Brady and Indirect Views of Emoional Persuasion
Before resting content with such a conclusion, we should consider its compatibility with a recent 
sophisticated account of the epistemic value of emotions, put forward by Michael Brady’s views in
his recent monograph, Emotional Insight.30 The main focus of Brady’s position as discussed there is 
his (plausible) claim that emotions motivate the search for, and evaluation of, reasons that bear 
on the accuracy of those emotions themselves. As such, Brady is arguing that emotions facilitate 
the development of understanding of (among other things) our evaluative situation. Let us 
distinguish two parts of this picture. The first is this motivation to investigate further – i.e. the 
way emotions get us fixated on their objects with a view (Brady argues) to improving our 
understanding of them. The second is the appraisal involved in the emotion itself. This receives 
29 (Döring 2003) 223.
30 (Brady 2016) esp. ch4.
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less attention in Brady’s discussion, but it is clearly part of his view – emotions involve an 
appraisal and additionally (and importantly for his agenda) motivate the subject to understand 
the objects of that appraisal better. Let us treat these in turn.
The appraisal: since Brady rejects the perceptual model, he may be sympathetic to a model of 
emotional appraisals that includes the possibility that in at least some cases, these involve 
commitment to the truth (or likelihood) of the appraisal. This fits with the idea that emotions 
seem to motivate and rationalise actions. And if so, then it seems as though on this basis, Brady 
can readily accept that in the kinds of cases of emotion featuring in legitimate persuasion that we
are discussing, the emotional appraisal involves commitment of the required kind.
By contrast, it seems as though the motivational aspect of emotions cannot be what enables them
to play the kind of legitimate role in persuasion that we are considering. For motivations to 
understand are not a kind of commitment to the truth of something. Brady supposes that in 
emotional experience, there are at least the following 2 components: (1) we appraise object x as F,
and (2) are motivated to understand reasons why x is F (or why it might not be F). It is clearly the 
first and not the second of these that is required if emotions are directly to supply premises to 
orators’ arguments in the manner we have been considering.
Nevertheless, have we too swiftly dismissed the possibility that emotions might contribute to the 
legitimate functioning of a persuasive argument without themselves providing the acceptance of 
one or more of the premises? Two options are here considered. One is the possibility that 
emotions’ legitimate persuasive contribution  somehow stems from the feature of emotional 
response to which Michael Brady has recently called attention – the way in which emotions focus 
our attention on their objects, in pursuit (as he argues) of an accurate understanding of our 
evaluative landscape. The other is an option for views of emotion according to which the 
representational aspect of those involves perceptions, aliefs or unasserted thoughts.
On the latter of these two view, emotions can be formed as a result of the same kind of evidence / 
basis / reasons that generate accompanying beliefs. So, the person ends up with an emotion and a
belief with similar content. The belief contributes to rhetorical persuasion. The emotion is a by-
product.
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Could this account for the phenomena we have highlighted? On the face of things, it seems 
unlikely. This ancillary role doesn’t seem to do justice to our sense that the emotion itself is doing
some important persuasive work in these cases. On this view, it is the audience’s beliefs, which 
are distinct states from their emotions, on this view, that are doing the persuasive work.
But perhaps this presumes too narrow a view of how emotions might make their contribution to 
persuasion. Perhaps although they don’t directly contribute to persuasion, the emotions keep the 
subject’s focus on their objects, and so make the belief in question difficult to dislodge.31
Perhaps the suggestion will be that the emotions serve to keep the belief in place, by making it 
emotionally charged and difficult to dislodge. This does not seem to get us what we wanted in 
order to vindicate the anti-austerity claim we are seeking to vindicate, i.e. that emotional 
persuasion is legitimate. For, on this view, the original question simply resurfaces – on what basis 
is this ancillary role for emotions legitimate? What would make it legitimate for emotions to keep
beliefs in place, so as to dispose audiences to accept conclusions of arguments in which they play 
a part? Surely we will wish to answer that by reference to epistemic justification, i.e. that the 
emotion keeps the belief in place not merely causally, but by justifying its retention. But this will 
then be subject to the same requirements for the transmission of justification (i.e. that it be itself 
justified, and involve commitment to the truth of its contents) that we were considering. 
Is there another possibility, drawing on the resources highlighted recently by Michael Brady? 
Could it be that emotions contribute to legitimate persuasion not directly, by contributing 
premises to inferences from which the subject then is justified in adopting the conclusion, but 
indirectly, by motivating a search for reasons that (in legitimate cases) justify belief in such a 
premise, and hence contribute to the justification of believing the conclusion? At first sight this 
seems a plausible suggestion.
The objections to this suggestion may not be wholly decisive, but they seem to me substantial, 
and are twofold. Firstly, it is not clear that this view gives us the right answer about which cases 
of emotional persuasion are legitimate and which are not. In the sections above, we have been 
considering the suggestion that legitimate use of emotions in persuasion takes place when the 
emotions that are aroused are epistemically justified, because it is then that the conclusions 
suitably inferred from them can be justified. That is, the audience will be justified in believing the
31 Note that this suggestion goes beyond the “coffee-and-cigarettes” type of role in persuasion, i.e. the role of 
enhancing the subject’s general attentiveness, that was considered and rejected earlier.
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conclusion when they are justified in believing the premises of the persuasive argument. But this 
justified belief in (one or more of) the premises is, for the Brady-inspired view we are now 
considering, the indirect result of the emotion aroused by the orator: that emotion gives rise to a 
search for reasons, and in the favourable case, those reasons justify their belief in the relevant 
premise(s). The justification or otherwise of that belief in the premises seems on this view to 
depend not on whether the emotion aroused is a justified emotion, but rather on what the 
audience themselves do when that emotion motivates them to seek reasons to support a belief in 
the emotion’s content. If that audience, motivated in that way, discovers good reasons, the 
resulting belief will be justified, if not, not. This seems wrong on two counts: firstly, it seems as 
though in the cases above, we would expect the legitimacy of the persuasive use of emotion to 
covary with the justification of the emotion aroused by the speaker; and secondly, it seems to put 
the legitimacy of the persuasive use of emotion outside the control of the orator to too great a 
degree. Whether the audience is legitimately persuaded seems, on this proposal, to depend 
primarily on what they do in response to the motivation to search for reasons supporting the 
evaluative construal involved in the emotion. And that is something outside the orator’s control. 
Perhaps it is something that the orator could predict, and we judge the legitimacy of their 
persuasive use of emotion, based on what they could reasonably expect of that audience. But this 
seems at odds with what it is most natural to say about the cases we are considering – namely 
that the legitimacy of their persuasive use of emotion depends on the grounds they provide for 
that emotion, i.e. the things they present to the audience as their basis for arousing that emotion.
The second concern is that this proposal does not seem to give a plausible psychological story 
about what happens in the kinds of cases we are considering. On this proposal, legitimate 
persuasion occurs because the orator arouses an emotion, which motivates a search for good 
reasons, which then justify the formation of a belief (with similar content to the emotion), whose 
content can then feature in the orator’s argument and contribute to justifying the audience’s 
adoption of the conclusion. There are a lot of steps in the sequence: orator’s speech, resulting 
emotion, search for reasons, justified belief in the premise(s), inference, adoption of conclusion. 
Some of these will be in common with any view of emotional persuasion of this kind. But this 
proposal has added significant complexity by introducing a search for reasons and the formation 
of a belief, both distinct from the emotion itself. Perhaps all this can happen seamlessly and 
quickly while the orator is speaking. But it is not obvious that that is so. On this proposal, we are 
being offered what seems to me an implausibly complex and extended account of the 
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psychological chain of events that occurs when Demosthenes, Jonah, Sojourner Truth or Ashley 
Judd persuades emotionally. 
On this basis, I am inclined to think we should prefer the simpler direct account of emotional 
persuasion that emerged from consideration of our examples and from the explanation of these 
seemingly offered in Aristotle’s Rhetoric.
On this simpler account, the emotions involved in legitimate persuasion will need to be 
themselves epistemically justified, and must involve the subject’s being committed to the truth or
likelihood of their representational contents.
9 Conclusion
I have sought to draw attention to the phenomenon of the persuasive use of emotion-arousal. 
Instances can be found in a whole variety of different cultural contexts, but I focused on 
Sojourner Truth’s emotional argument from 1851, in favour of women’s suffrage, as a 
representative example. In such cases, I have proposed that emotion-arousal deserves to be 
recognised as playing an integral role in how a person comes to change their mind, and that this 
kind of use of emotion-arousal is a legitimate persuasive method (a claim I called “ANTI-
AUSTERITY”). I have sought to show that this is consistent with the view (which I called 
“PROPRIETY”) that people should be persuaded only on grounds that contribute to justifying 
their inclination to favour what the speaker proposes.. I have briefly defended Aristotle’s view 
that the best account of how emotion-arousal produces persuasion legitimately is that the 
emotions supply premises to inferences that the audience is encouraged to make, and whose 
conclusion they are encouraged to endorse. If this view is correct, it has interesting implications 
for the nature of the emotions involved. Although they need not (and perhaps must not) literally 
involve beliefs, it turns out that the representational aspect of emotions involved in legitimate 
emotion-arousal must have two belief-like features: it must be capable of being epistemically 
justified and must involve commitment to the truth (or likelihood) of their represented content. 
As such, the phenomenon of the persuasive use of emotion-arousal has substantive, interesting 
and challenging implications for our wider views of the emotions.
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